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FRESH EYES: YOUNG V. STATE’S
NEW EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
TEST AND PROSPECTS FOR ALASKA
AND BEYOND
Savannah Hansen Best*
This Note evaluates recent developments in Alaska’s eyewitness identification
admissibility doctrine under the 2016 case Young v. Alaska. For the past four
decades, federal and most state courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s 1977
ruling in Manson v. Brathwaite, which identified five admissibility factors—
known as the “Biggers factors”—for establishing the reliability of eyewitness
identifications made under the influence of unnecessarily suggestive police
procedures (“systemic variables”). In recent decades, however, social and
psychological science has demonstrated the flaws in the five Biggers factors as
reliability indicators and the impact of non-suggestive circumstantial (or
“estimator”) variables on eyewitness identification reliability. In Young,
Alaska joined New Jersey and Oregon as the third state to break from
Brathwaite, employing a new and evolving admissibility test with scientific
support, consideration of both systemic and estimator variables, and a call for
corresponding jury instructions.

In 2016, the Alaska Supreme Court broke step with nearly forty
years of established criminal procedure through its decision in Young v.
Alaska,1 adopting a new test for the admission of eyewitness
identifications. In Young, Alaska opened pre-trial hearings on the
reliability of eyewitness identifications to evidence and consideration of
both systematic and circumstantial flaws that may affect those
identifications.2 Until recently, both federal and state courts, following the
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1. 374 P.3d 395 (Alaska 2016).
2. Id. at 427.
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United States Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Manson v. Brathwaite,3
have employed a narrow definition what constitutes a suggestive
procedure and set aside concerns about reliability even when faced with
clearly manipulated identifications.4 Young looks squarely at the
unreliability of eyewitness identifications and suggests new and greatly
improved mechanisms for assessing it. In doing so, Alaska aligns itself
with other states that have drawn on recent social science to update the
court’s treatment of problematic eyewitness identifications.5
Young carefully confronts and—where appropriate—uproots
longstanding conceptions about the reliability of eyewitness
identifications, accounting for modern scientific insights about the
malleability of such identifications. For example, careful study has helped
identify the difference between system variables—suggestive influences
manufactured by the state—and estimator variables—circumstantial
factors which internally influence eyewitnesses and may also lead to
flawed identifications.6 Following the lead of other state courts that have
departed from Brathwaite, Young incorporates numerous psychological
and sociological studies in creating additional procedural steps that
address system variables, while calling for further development of
guidelines that can combat estimator flaws.7 For instance, Young created
3. 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (declaring that reliability is the “linchpin in
determining the admissibility of identification testimony” and providing five
factors to test reliability).
4. See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 241 (2012) (limiting
review for admissibility of eyewitness identifications to suggestive conduct
arranged by police, such as “improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays”);
Brathwaite, 432 U.S at 114 (addressing only five factors which may be manipulated
by suggestive policing procedures); Holden v. State, 602 P.2d 452, 456 (Alaska
1979) (stating that an accusation of a suspect by means of a single photograph is
improper, yet that its admission is not necessarily reversible error because it may
still be reliable, “as weighed against the corrupting effect of the suggestive
identification itself”).
5. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 919–22 (N.J. 2011) (devising a
new reliability test based on a wide range of non-exclusive factors to determine
admissibility of eyewitness identifications); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 696–97
(Or. 2012) (creating an eyewitness identification admissibility test based on the
Oregon Evidence Code’s admissibility rules, including those on personal
knowledge and unfair prejudice, with a presumption of unreliability and unfair
prejudice arising from suggestive police procedures).
6. See Young, 374 P.3d. at 417–26 (identifying system and estimator variables
and describing their psychological impact on witnesses through a thorough
review of peer-reviewed literature).
7. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 919–22 (N.J. 2011) (citing peerreviewed studies). Young bases much of its analysis on other studies, including
Roy S. Malpass et al., The Need for Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION 3, 14 (Brian L. Cutler ed. 2009) (recognizing the rigor of testing and
peer-reviewed quality control required for principles to gain general acceptance
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an additional procedural step that uses evidentiary hearings to address
system and estimator variables.8 While this step does not altogether
eliminate the various dangers that eyewitness identification flaws create,9
it does effectively shift the focus from a myopic procedural view of the
benefits of eyewitness identifications to a broader appreciation of the
positive and negative impacts of such evidence on criminal trials.10
Although Alaska is not the first state to depart from the Brathwaite
doctrine and adopt such a test,11 this Note looks at Young’s innovation in
Alaskan criminal procedure and suggests that other states should
consider if such a break from historical doctrine could also serve their
criminal justice systems well and more closely align with their state
constitutional guarantees of due process.
The Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Young builds on the
decisions of other state courts that have broken with federal
jurisprudence. While the federal courts have focused on a narrow concern
with police suggestiveness, as reinforced in 2012 by the Supreme Court in
Perry v. New Hampshire,12 Young broadens the focus in Alaska by taking
into account recent trends in other states, advanced social science on
suggestiveness and circumstantial reliability factors, and the often
weighty impact of flawed eyewitness identifications in wrongful
convictions.13 Basing its holding on these doctrines and scientific
progress, the Alaska Supreme Court has created a flexible, adaptable
method for protecting criminal proceedings from many of the corrupting
effects of unreliable eyewitness identifications. Young not only forges a
path forward for Alaska but also serves as a beacon of progress for states

in the scientific community); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 21
(Harvard Univ. Press 1996) (detailing the three steps in the process of memory
and dispelling the notion that memory operates like a recording). There are also a
multitude of studies on the effects of state-induced and circumstantial variables
that impact reliability summarized in REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, State v.
Henderson, A-8-08, at 79 (N.J. June 18, 2010).
8. See Young, 374 P.3d at 427.
9. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922 (“[w]e recognize that scientific research relating
to the reliability of eyewitness evidence is dynamic; the field is very different
today than it was in 1977, and it will likely be quite different thirty years from
now”).
10. See generally Young, 374 P.3d at 416–26 (broadening admissibility
considerations far beyond a five-factor reliability test and balancing the need for
eyewitness identifications with the risks they present).
11. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919–22 (detailing New Jersey’s eyewitness
admissibility test on which Young is substantially based).
12. 565 U.S. 228, 241 (2012) (holding that a due process remedy will only be
considered for an “unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure” and that
Brathwaite “comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper police
conduct”).
13. See generally Young, 374 P.3d at 413–26.
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in the lower forty-eight still in need of comprehensive procedural reform
beyond the Brathwaite and Perry precedents.14

I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Brathwaite Doctrine

Modern federal eyewitness identification jurisprudence—which the
majority of states still follow—stems from the Supreme Court’s 1977 case,
Manson v. Brathwaite, which considered the issue of excluding suggestive
eyewitness out-of-court identifications from criminal trials under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.15 In that case, Nowell
Brathwaite was charged with, and convicted of, possession and sale of
heroin in Connecticut state court.16 The prosecutor tied Brathwaite to the
heroin exclusively through an identification made by an undercover state
trooper, who had purchased drugs from a man behind an apartment door
that had been opened twelve to eighteen inches.17 After the purchase, the
trooper returned to police headquarters and spoke with other officers,
where he described the seller’s appearance.18 One of those other officers
went to the police’s records department and retrieved a photograph of
Brathwaite, who he suspected might be seller.19 The trooper who made
the purchase identified Brathwaite based on review of that single
photograph, rather than a photo array, and identified Brathwaite in court
eight months later.20
The district court considered two constitutional issues: whether the
police used a suggestive tactic to obtain the out-of-court identification,
and if so, whether that suggestive tactic, under the totality of the
circumstances, led to a “substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.”21 Three eyewitness identification doctrines
promulgated by the Supreme Court laid the main foundation for
Brathwaite’s analysis of the admissibility of the undercover agent’s
identification and, more broadly, the admission standard still employed

14. Id. at 416 (“In the belief that a new approach—based on a better
understanding of the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness
identifications—will lead to the exclusion of unreliable evidence and thereby
reduce the risk of wrongful convictions, we conclude that breaking away from
our long reliance on the Brathwaite test will do more good than harm.”).
15. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977).
16. Id. at 101–02.
17. Id. at 107.
18. Id. at 101.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 101–02.
21. Id. at 107.
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in federal courts today: Stovall v. Denno,22 Simmons v. United States,23 and,
perhaps most significantly, Neil v. Biggers.24
The first of these cases, Stovall, opened the door to the possibility of
exclusion for identifications obtained through police procedures that are
unnecessarily suggestive.25 However, its holding by no means provided
for automatic exclusion whenever an identification passed the
unnecessarily suggestive threshold.26 Stovall imposed a totality of the
circumstances test on eyewitness identifications subject to suggestiveness
to determine the permissibility of admission.27 Before allowing the
petitioner in Stovall—suspected of stabbling the witness after killing her
husband—time to retain counsel, the police escorted him into the
witness’s hospital room for identification.28 Although individually
presenting a suspect to a witness for identification is and was, at the time
Stovall arose, a widely-condemned practice, the Court said that the
“imperative” nature of the witness’s identification, given the
circumstances, outweighed the concerns about suggestiveness
surrounding the identification.29 The Supreme Court found the admission
of the identification therefore did not violate the petitioner’s right to due
process,30 as “a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of
a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding
it,” and the necessity of the identification heavily factored into that
equation.31
Brathwaite also built on the holding of Neil v. Biggers, decided five
years after Stovall, which examined the reliability of an eyewitness
identification procured from a show up (where officers bring a suspect
back to the crime scene to be identified by witnesses there).32 The Biggers
22. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
23. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
24. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
25. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
26. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 113.
27. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
28. Id. at 295.
29. Id. at 302. In Stovall, the Court of Appeals en banc noted that the witness,
who identified the defendant in her hospital room, was the only person who could
exonerate him. Id. Her identification was deemed “imperative,” although the
defendant was the only black man in the room at the time of the identification,
conducted in the presence of police officers. Id.
30. Id. at 296.
31. See id. at 302 (considering the following factors in the “totality of the
circumstances”: the spouse was the one person who could exonerate the
defendant; the hospital was close to the courthouse and jail; the risk that the
witness would not live much longer; the witness could not visit the jail; and taking
the defendant to the hospital was the only way to conduct an identification, as,
under the circumstances, a lineup was not possible).
32. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972) (holding that the admission of
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Court inquired whether, “under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the
identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was
suggestive,”33 and announced five factors to help determine the reliability
of an eyewitness identification made under suggestive conditions.34 The
factors were:
[T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time
of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the
witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length
of time between the crime and the confrontation.35
By limiting the scope of the inquiry to the relationship between
suggestiveness by police and misidentification, Biggers concluded that if
the identification was reliable under the stated factors, then even a
suggestive procedure would not bar its admission on due process
grounds.36
Following Biggers, two approaches regarding the issue of suggestive
eyewitness identifications emerged in the circuit courts.37 The first
approach, recognizing the issues raised in Stovall and Biggers but
discontent with their preference for inclusion of still potentially unreliable
identifications, called for exclusion of identifications obtained through
unnecessarily suggestive procedures, regardless of reliability (commonly
referred to as the “per se approach”).38 The second approach, informed
by the totality of the circumstances test in Stovall and the reliability
calculus promulgated in Biggers, rejected a per se rule of exclusion in favor
of balancing the results of these two factual inquiries.39 This approach
admitted that eyewitness identification may be suggestive, but could
nevertheless be admitted because the Biggers factors indicated some
reliability.40
While the Brathwaite Court recognized that the exclusion of all
identifications procured through unnecessarily suggestive police
procedures could create a deterrent effect,41 the Court adopted a totality

an identification made pursuant to a showup and voice identification of the
suspect, where he was accompanied by two detectives walking him past the
victim seven months after the rape in question, did not violate due process).
33. Id. at 199.
34. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200.
35. Id.
36. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977).
37. Id. at 110.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 112.

35.1 BEST (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

YOUNG EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

5/3/2018 7:42 PM

47

of the circumstances approach in order to balance the societal benefit of
positively influencing police behavior through the exclusionary rule with
the cost of excluding relevant and “reliable” evidence from consideration
by the trier of fact.42 In concluding its evaluations of these approaches,
Brathwaite declared: “reliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony for both pre- and post-Stovall
confrontations.”43 Brathwaite established the Biggers factors as the
prevailing federal doctrine in determining the admissibility of eyewitness
identifications subject to unnecessarily suggestive police procedures.44
Brathwaite’s determination of unnecessary suggestiveness, combined with
Biggers’ admissibility determination for identifications deemed
unnecessarily suggestive, remains the two-pronged test in federal courts,
despite its reliance on outdated psychological conceptions of reliability
and the absence of meaningful procedural protections against the many
inherent flaws of eyewitness identifications.45
B.

Henderson, Perry, and The Federal-State Divide

Thirty-four years after Brathwaite announced its admissibility test for
eyewitness identifications procured by unnecessarily suggestive police
procedures, New Jersey initiated a movement away from the totality of
the circumstances test.46 In 2011, in State v. Henderson, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey adopted an eyewitness identification admissibility test
grounded in scientific reseach.47 But in 2012, the Supreme Court further
entrenched the outdated Brathwaite doctrine in the federal courts through
its holding in Perry v. New Hampshire.48 These two cases, decided just five
months apart, brought to light a deep division between the federal and
42. See id. at 110–12 (evaluating the costs and benefits of the per se and totality
rules on the factors of reliability, deterrence, and the effect on the administration
of justice).
43. Id. at 114.
44. Id.
45. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 919–22 (N.J. 2011). Henderson, the first
state decision to broaden the scope of due process protections against
suggestiveness and estimator variables, incorporated modern social scientific
understandings about the effect of police procedure on identifications as well as
inaccurate assumptions about the inherent validity of eyewitness identifications.
See generally id.
46. See id. at 877–922 (rejecting many of the principles of Brathwaite,
explaining modern understandings about eyewitness reliability, and establishing
a new admissibility test).
47. See id. at 919–22 (detailing new admissibility requirements and due
process protections).
48. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245 (2012) (refusing to broaden
the domain of due process protections beyond Brathwaite’s recognition of
suggestive procedures and application of the Biggers factors).
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state courts in answering the question: under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law, should courts develop
procedures to protect against eyewitness identification flaws that go
beyond the scope of direct and pre-arranged suggestive police
techniques—and if so, what should those be?49
The Supreme Court Speaks Again in Perry
Perry highlighted the current federal eyewitness admissibility
doctrine’s emphasis that reliability inquiries arise only where an improper
police influence has potentially impacted the identification.50 In other
words, improper influence serves as a threshold for any judicial inquiry
into the reliability of an identification, regardless of surrounding
circumstances arising outside of police control.51 The petitioner in Perry
was convicted on state theft charges.52 The eyewitness identification in
question occurred in response to a police officer asking a witness, who
had indicated that she had seen a man breaking into cars in her apartment
building’s parking lot, to describe what she had seen.53 When the officer
asked her for a more specific description of the man, she pointed out her
kitchen window at the petitioner, who was standing in the parking lot
with another officer.54 Perry argued that the admission of this
identification at his trial was error, as suggestive circumstances alone
“suffice to trigger the court’s duty to evaluate the reliability of the
resulting identification before allowing presentation of the evidence to the

49. Compare Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922–23 (expanding the variables judges in
pre-trial admissibility hearings should consider beyond unnecessary suggestion
and the Biggers factors), with Perry, 565 U.S. at 241 (limiting any opportunity for
exclusion of an identification to instances of “unnecessarily suggestive”
identification procedures).
50. Perry, 565 U.S. at 231 (holding that if “indicia of reliability are strong
enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive
circumstances, the identification evidence ordinarily will be admitted, and the
jury will ultimately determine its worth”).
51. Id. at 261–62 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court sets “a high
bar for suppression[] [and] [t]he vast majority of eyewitnesses proceed to testify
before a jury” as a result of the narrowly defined due process protection
recognized in federal courts pursuant to eyewitness identifications); see also
Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Bouthot, 878
F.2d 1506, 1516 (1st Cir. 1989); Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir. 1986);
Green v. Loggins, 614 F.2d 219, 223 (9th Cir. 1980) (declining in each case to find
due process violations on claims of improper police influence).
52. Perry, 565 U.S. at 234.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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jury.”55 The Court disagreed with the petitioner’s proposed rule to subject
any suggestive eyewitness identification to judicial prescreening.56
Discussing the reasons for its rejection of the petitioner’s requested
standard, the Court noted that the reliability “linchpin” announced in
Brathwaite “comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper
police conduct.”57 Without evidence of suggestion, the second prong of
Brathwaite—determining reliability once a procedure is found to be
suggestive—does not apply and cannot result in the exclusion of an
identification.58 This is true even if the conditions surrounding the
identification were tainted with indicia of unreliability, such as the effects
of stress the witness experienced when making the identification, how
long the witness observed the suspect, or biases associated with the race
of the witness and the suspect.59 The Court in Perry effectively limited
constitutional due process protections against flawed eyewitness
identifications to a narrow set of unfair police practices.60 Even though the
Court had long acknowledged that “the annals of criminal law are rife
with instances of mistaken identification,”61 it defined improper influence
in a way that placed circumstantial and inherent flaws in identification
procedures beyond judicial reach, as such flaws cannot easily be linked to
overt suggestion. In the aftermath of Perry, courts remain relegated to the
suggestiveness framework provided by Brathwaite, while factors
identified by modern social science as equally likely to cause improper
influence go unaddressed.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Perry further illustrated the federal
courts’ traditional failure to serve an activist role in improving criminal
procedure and their delay in accounting for scientific developments.62
55. Id. at 236.
56. Id. at 240.
57. Id. at 241; see also id. at 245 (“The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does
not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule
requiring a trial court to screen out such evidence for reliability . . . .”).
58. Id. at 243–44.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 232–33 (limiting the definition of such unfair practices to
suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement officers, such as lineups,
showups, and photographic arrays).
61. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
62. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 63 (2011) (referring to Brathwaite’s test as
“toothless” in ensuring due process); Michael H. Hoffheimer, Requiring Jury
Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence at Federal Criminal Trials, 80 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585, 586–87 (1989) (explaining federal courts have generally
encouraged but not mandated powerful eyewitness identification jury
instructions); Robert Couch, A Model for Fixing Identification Evidence After Perry v.
New Hampshire, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (2013) (noting Perry’s failure to set a
post-Brathwaite standard exemplifies that real reform must be state-led).
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The Supreme Court has taken some steps to identify and correct
procedural problems often involved in misidentifications, such as the
issue of independent origins of in-court identifications in United States v.
Wade, where the Court held that a trial court must hold a hearing to
determine whether an in-court identification has an independent source
where it is unclear whether it originated from a defendant’s observations
or a police lineup subject to improper influence.63 However, state courts
and legislatures have more frequently and quickly implemented much
deeper change. For example, states have diligently worked to develop
investigatory committees, new statutes, and procedural remedies to
address issues of admissibility of misidentifications, poor jury
instructions regarding reliability of eyewitness identifications, false
confessions, and other unreliable evidence which often leads to wrongful
convictions.64 Federal courts, in contrast, have largely relegated the search
for solutions to the states and adopted few measures to combat common
procedural issues in areas such as eyewitness identifications, hearsay, and
false confessions.65 This apathy and lack of urgency within the federal
system to account for science is especially dangerous in the context of
eyewitness identification procedures because assumptions about
eyewitnesses in traditional jurisprudence are not only lagging or
incomplete, they are often entirely opposite from the truth.66
New Jersey Breaks with Brathwaite
At the state level, the New Jersey Supreme Court has led the way in
appreciating how important modern social science should impact courts’
review of eyewitness identifications through its decision in Henderson.
Henderson not only identified Brathwaite reliability factors that may have
a counterintuitive impact on reliability such as confidence, degree of
attention, and opportunity to view the crime, but integrated new
scientifically-supported reliability factors into its new eyewitness
identification admissibility test.67 The case involved an eyewitness who,
63. Wade, 388 U.S. at 242.
64. GARRETT, supra note 62, at 241–52.
65. Id.
66. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 7, at 79 (noting three of five
reliability factors utilized by Brathwaite test are in fact unreliable, as they are often
“strengthened by the suggestive conduct against which they are to be weighed”:
confidence, degree of attention, and opportunity to view the suspect).
67. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 919 (N.J. 2011) (laying new framework
for admissibility test which would “consider all relevant factors that affect
reliability in deciding whether an identification is admissible; that is not heavily
weighted by factors that can be corrupted by suggestiveness; that promotes
deterrence in a meaningful way; and that focuses on helping jurors both
understand and evaluate the effects that various factors have on memory”).
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unable to identify the picture of the defendant in a photographic lineup
following the crime, was told by an officer to “just do what you have to
do, and we’ll be out of here.”68 During a pre-trial hearing to the validity
of the identification, the witness testified that he felt he was being nudged
into making a certain choice.69 Subjecting the identification to the
Brathwaite test—requiring determination of whether the police
procedures were unnecessarily suggestive and, if so, whether the
identification was admissible nonetheless because it met the Biggers
factors—the trial court found the identification admissible under the
totality of the circumstances.70 The Appellate Division reversed, however,
concluding that the photographic lineup was impermissibly suggestive,
and thus required exclusion, because the investigating officers, by their
statements to the witness, deliberately intruded in order to influence the
witness’s choice.71
Before the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the parties and amici
suggested that Brathwaite and New Jersey’s own photographic
identification test, in State v. Madison,72 were ill-adapted to scientific
research relevant to eyewitness identifications.73 A report produced by
the Special Master reviewed over 360 exhibits, including over 200
scientific studies of the influence of human memory on eyewitness
identifications.74 It also considered testimony from seven experts in the
fields of psychology, criminal defense, and wrongful convictions during
a ten-day remand hearing.75 In response to the studies and testimony
68. Id. at 881.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 881–82.
71. Id. at 884.
72. 536 A.2d 254, 255, 265 (N.J. 1988). Madison addressed whether out-ofcourt, police-conducted photographic identification procedures were so
impermissibly suggestive that they gave rise to a substantial likelihood of an
irreparable mistaken identification. Id. The court, falling in line with Brathwaite
and Wade, held that the defendant had to sufficiently establish undue
suggestiveness to receive a reliability hearing, and if so, the burden shifted to the
State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the identification’s source
was independent. Id.
73. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 884.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 884–85. The Innocence Project, amicus curiae, called Dr. Gary L.
Wells, Distinguished Professor of Psychology at Iowa State University; Professor
James M. Doyle, Director of the Center for Forensic Practice at John Jay College of
Criminal Justice; and Dr. John Monahan, Distinguished Professor of Law at the
University of Virginia with a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology. Id. The defendant
called Dr. Steven Penrod, Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the John Jay
College of Criminal Justice; and Professor Jules Epstein, Associate Professor of
Law at Widener University School of Law. Id. The State called Dr. Roy Malpass,
Professor of Psychology at the University of Texas, El Paso. Id. Drs. Wells, Penrod,
and Malpass testified about scientific research in the eyewitness identification
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presented, the Report of the Special Master encompassed a broad range
of psychological findings on human memory, a field which had only just
begun to receive the attention of researchers during the 1970s, prior to
Brathwaite.76 The Report recognized, from the research and testimony
presented, that human memory “does not function like a videotape,
accurately and thoroughly capturing and reproducing a person or event,”
but is “a constructive, dynamic and selective process.”77 Instead, human
memory functions in three stages: the acquisition stage (where
information is perceived and enters the viewer’s memory system), the
retention stage (the period of time which passes between perception and
the viewer’s attempt to recall the event), and the retrieval stage (where
the viewer attempts to recall the event).78
Because many variables can influence the reliability of the
information stored at any stage in the memory process, divorcing
considerations of suggestiveness from relevant reliability concerns, as the
two-pronged Brathwaite test does, fails to allow for an evaluation of the
true totality of the circumstances .79 If a witness’s self-reported certainty,
degree of attention, and opportunity to view the suspect are positively
correlated with the level of suggestion provided by the police in making
the identification, it makes little sense to uphold the admission of the
identification—even if found unnecessary and improperly suggestive—
because the circumstances of the identification as self-reported by the
witness deem it “reliable.”80
The factors that can influence memory and, specifically, eyewitness
identification accounts fall into two categories: system variables and
estimator variables.81 System variables include circumstances and
procedures under the control of law enforcement or, more broadly, the
criminal justice system.82 These factors include—but are not limited to—
blind administration (such as in conducting a lineup procedure), preidentification instructions, lineup construction, avoiding feedback and
recording confidence, multiple viewings, simultaneous versus sequential

field. Id.
76. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 7, at 8–9.
77. Id. at 9 (referring to research principles from ELIZABETH E. LOFTUS ET AL.,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2:2 (5th ed. 2014)).
78. LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 77.
79. Steven Penrod et al., The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony: A Psychological
Perspective, in THE PSYCHOL. OF THE COURT ROOM 119, 122–46 (1982).
80. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 7, at 10.
81. Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and
Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1546 (1978).
82. Id.
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lineups, composites, and show ups.83 The Brathwaite factors generally
parallel these system factors.
In contrast, estimator variables—which are often highly influential—
are largely extraneous to the criminal justice system. They include
characteristics of the witness or perpetrator and circumstances
surrounding the identification itself.84 While estimator variables are also
capable of negatively impacting the reliability of an eyewitness
identification, they are not accounted for in Brathwaite’s suggestiveness
and reliability test.85 Estimator variables include—but are not limited to—
stress, weapons focus, duration, distance and lighting, witness
characteristics (such as age and intoxication), characteristics of the
perpetrator (such as changes in facial features and disguises), memory
decay, race-bias, private actors (non-State actors who expose the witness
to opinions, photographs, descriptions, or other influential information),
and the speed of the identification.86 The factors provided in Biggers—
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, degree of
attention, accuracy of prior description of the criminal, level of certainty
at the time of the confrontation, and the time between the crime and
confrontation—while not innately reliable, are also considered estimator
variables.87
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the Brathwaite test
rested on three assumptions in order to protect due process: “(1) that it
would adequately measure the reliability of eyewitness testimony; (2)
that the test’s focus on suggestive police procedure would deter improper
practices; and (3) that jurors would recognize and discount
untrustworthy eyewitness testimony.”88 But the court noted that
experience had proven these assumptions to be untrue.89 Therefore, it

83. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896–903 (N.J. 2011).
84. Wells, supra note 81, at 1546.
85. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 904; see also Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228,
245 (2012) (“The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of
improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen
such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its
creditworthiness.”).
86. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 904–10.
87. Id. at 921–22.
88. Id. at 918 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112–16 (1977)).
89. See id. at 918–19 (explaining that Brathwaite fails to meet its goals because
courts ignore the effect of estimator variables without a finding of impermissible
police action; witnesses’ opportunity to view a crime, their degree of attention,
and how certain they are at the time they make an identification are determined
by self-reporting which is susceptible to influence by suggestive processes—
rather than deterring it; suppression is the only option for suggestive evidence
and few courts will sanction it; and the reliability factors are, in practice, treated
more like a checklist than a totality of the circumstances test).
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found that the Brathwaite test had burdened due process.90 It also
recognized the significant harm caused by misidentifications in
jurisprudential history, relying on the alarming data presented on the
connection between such flawed evidence and wrongful conviction
rates.91
Taking into account such high risk for miscarriage of justice, the New
Jersey court formed a new flexible test that addresses system and
estimator variables and incorporated the scientific findings provided in
the Special Master’s report.92 Accordingly, under New Jersey’s Henderson
test, to secure a pretrial hearing, the defendant must carry the initial
burden of showing some evidence of suggestiveness which would result
in a misidentification, generally tied to a system variable.93 Next, the
burden shifts to the State to offer proof of reliability, whether in the form
of system or estimator variables.94 The court may at any time end the
hearing on grounds that the threshold claim of suggestiveness is
baseless.95 The defendant, who carries the ultimate burden of proving a
“very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” can crossexamine eyewitnesses and police officers and present evidence linked to
system or estimator variables.96 Then, based on the totality of the
circumstances from the evidence presented, if the court finds a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, it should suppress
the eyewitness identification.97 If not, upon admitting the identification to
the trier of fact, the court should give tailored jury instructions to
appropriately guide juries through the system and estimator variables
that may have influenced the reliability of a given identification.98 The
instruction may include a list of variables that may disrupt an accurate
90. See id. (disapproving the following aspects of the Brathwaite test: (1)
estimator factors are ignored unless impermissibly suggestive police conduct is
shown, and only then may the five estimator factors announced in Biggers be
considered; (2) three of the five Biggers factors may be skewed by suggestive
procedures; (3) rather than deterring police suggestiveness, the Brathwaite test
may reward it because more suggestion is correlated with higher confidence and
more favorable reports about the viewing conditions; (4) Brathwaite only
addresses the option of suppression; and (5) the totality of the circumstances
mandate is undermined by the Biggers factors, which are often used as a checklist).
91. Id. at 929; see also GARRETT, supra note 62, at 48 (finding eyewitnesses
misidentified 76% of the exonerees in a 250-case study of wrongful convictions
overturned by DNA evidence).
92. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 917 (acknowledging consistency in scientific
experimentation on eyewitness identifications and variables that influence them).
93. Id. at 920.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 924.
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identification and language to warn jurors of potential flaws in otherwise
seemingly correct identifications. For example, a model jury instruction
reads: “ Although nothing may appear more convincing than a witness’s
categorical identification of a perpetrator, you must critically analyze
such testimony. Such identifications, even if made in good faith, may be
mistaken.”99
The Henderson test does two things for litigants of identifications.
First, by broadening the factors that a judge in a pre-trial admissibility
hearing can consider, it departs from the scientifically-fallible
assumptions about the reliability of eyewitness identifications in
Brathwaite and forces the State to prove a much higher degree of
independent reliability from eyewitness identifications before it can be
submitted to the trier of fact.100 Second, it inverts the burden of production
in a peculiar way: shifting the responsibility to the defendant to show
evidence of variables which detract from the identification’s reliability,
rather than focusing on the five Biggers factors, evidence of which the State
would carry the burden of providing under Brathwaite.101 Yet this actually
works to the benefit of the defendant, as the range of admissible variables
is much broader (possessing no definitive limit) and serves to defeat the
identification’s reliability instead of only focusing on the availability of
State evidence to support it.102 As for the judge, the Henderson test still
affords a measure of discretion on the issue of whether expert testimony
on reliability of eyewitness identifications will be beneficial to the jury, as
well as discretion to redact portions of an identification in rare cases
pursuant to New Jersey’s version of the Federal Rule of Evidence 403.103
Finally, the last piece to the Henderson test takes into account that
jurors often “do not evaluate eyewitness memory in a manner consistent
with psychological theory and findings.”104 Instead, jurors tend to
deprioritize factors such as distance and lighting, while giving
disproportionate weight to factors such as the witness’s confidence.105 The
99. COMM. ON MODEL CRIM. JURY CHARGES, NON 2C CHARGES: IDENTIFICATION:
IN AND OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS (Sept. 4, 2012), https://www.judiciary.
state.nj.us/attorneys/assets/criminalcharges/idinout.pdf.
100. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919.
101. Id. at 920–22.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 925 (explaining that although revised jury instructions should
serve to reduce the need for such expert testimony, such discretion is allowed in
the rare instance where a redaction accomplishes a balance between the need for
relevant evidence and the prejudicial concerns of Rule 403); see also OR. REV. STAT.
§ 40.160 (2017) (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”).
104. Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence,
14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 190 (1990).
105. Id.
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Henderson test, given the reality that most eyewitness identifications will
be admitted, ensures that jurors receive adequate instructions about the
many factors affecting identifications, some of which are not only nonintuitive but counterintuitive.106 For example, while a juror may consider
a witness’s confidence highly telling of the identification’s accuracy,
confidence is a factor easily manipulated by suggestive techniques and
may, therefore, be indicative that the identification is actually
unreliable.107 The New Jersey Supreme Court charged the state’s Criminal
Practice Committee and the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges
with drafting revised jury instructions incorporating those system and
estimator variables, which the court found to be supported by generally
accepted scientific principles.108 Given the significant impact of own-race
bias in eyewitness identifications,109 the court also charged the
committees to draft a jury instruction specifically for cases involving
cross-racial identification.110
C.

Gaining Traction: Other States Join the Trend

One year after the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Henderson,
Oregon followed suit by announcing a similar test in State v. Lawson.111
Lawson adopts many of the same scientific rationales as Henderson,112 and
closely mirrors its discussion of system and estimator variables.113 The

106. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925 (“[W]hether the science confirms commonsense
views or dispels preconceived but not necessarily valid intuitions, it can properly
and usefully be considered by both judges and jurors in making their assessments
of eyewitness reliability.”).
107. See People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 377 (2007) (citing 1 McCormick,
Evidence § 206, at 880 (6th ed. 2006), for the premise that degree of confidence can
be influenced by, for example, misleading questions asked after a witness’s
viewing of a suspect).
108. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925–26; see also COMM. ON MODEL CRIM. JURY
CHARGES, supra note 99.
109. See, e.g., Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of
Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB., POL’Y, & L. 3, 21, 27 (2001) (finding, in thirty-nine studies and
almost 5000 participants, that cross-racial identifications raise unique difficulties
and a significant risk for misidentification).
110. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 926 (broadening the Cromedy instruction from State
v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467 (N.J. 1999), on cross-racial identifications beyond
only cases where identification is a critical issue in the case).
111. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012) (en banc). In Lawson, Oregon
broke away from the reliability-focused Brathwaite doctrine still employed in
federal and many state courts. See id. at 690 (rejecting Oregon’s 1979 Classen test
for determining admissibility of eyewitness identifications).
112. Id. at 685–86 (noting that over 2000 scientific studies on the reliability of
eyewitness identifications had been conducted since Classen was decided in 1979).
113. Id. at 686–88 (listing and defining system and estimator variables).
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Lawson test consists of two prongs. First, if the defendant moves for a pretrial hearing, the State must show that the identification at issue meets
Oregon’s evidentiary admissibility rules, which parallel requirements of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.114 Next, the defendant must present
evidence that the identification’s relevance is substantially outweighed by
the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury,
and undue delay or cumulative evidence.115 Evidence of a suggestive
variable can “give rise to an inference of unreliability that is sufficient to
undermine the perceived accuracy and truthfulness of an eyewitness
identification—[and] only then may a trial court exclude [it] . . . .”116 If the
court admits the identification, a defendant may present expert testimony
on reliability issues with eyewitness identifications or request a jury
instruction tailored to the reliability factors relevant to the case.117
Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Gomes,118 took yet another route
in its rejection of the Brathwaite framework. The court reformed its prior
jury instructions on the reliability of eyewitness identifications to include
additional generally accepted principles.119 The Massachusetts Supreme
Court reasoned that five scientific principles had reached the “near
consensus in the relevant scientific community” sufficient to mandate
inclusion in jury instructions, not as a replacement for but as a more
robust counterpart to expert testimony on reliability.120 These factors
include: (1) that memory consists of three processing stages, (2) that
certainty alone does not indicate accuracy, (3) that high levels of stress
may reduce ability to make an accurate identification, (4) that information
unrelated to the actual viewing of the event received before or after
making an identification can affect later recollection of the memory or the
identification, and (5) that a viewing of a suspect in an identification
procedure may negatively affect the reliability of a subsequent
identification showing the same suspect.121
Several states have, since Brathwaite, fashioned procedures for
ensuring greater protections when the State in a criminal case seeks to
introduce an eyewitness identification.122 However, New Jersey, Oregon,
114. Id. at 696–97.
115. Id. at 697 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 40.160 (2017)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015).
119. Id. at 911 (applying the scientific findings cumulated in ROBERT J. KANE ET
AL., SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GROUP ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JUSTICES (2013), http://mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/
docs/eyewitness-evidence-report-2013.pdf).
120. Id. at 911–16.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 45 N.E.3d 83, 92 (Mass. 2016)
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and Massachusetts stand out as the three states who have subverted
traditional assumptions about the reliability of such identifications and
have reevaluated the right to stronger due process protections in light of
their pitfalls.123 Alaska joined the fold in 2016, announcing an eyewitness
identification admissibility test in Young v. State and serving as yet
another beacon for states—as well as federal courts—to join eyewitness
identification reform.124

II. THE YOUNG TEST: ALASKA’S MODEL FOR CHANGE
A.

Alaska Before Young

Prior to Young, Alaska’s controlling case law on the admissibility of
eyewitness identifications, Holden v. State,125 followed the Brathwaite
doctrine without questioning its scientific validity.126 Much of Alaska’s
case law—flowing from Brathwaite, Stovall, and Biggers—focused on
merely applying the reliability elements to the facts of the case rather than
providing any comprehensive explanation of the Holden test or any
(“Where the suggestiveness does not arise from police conduct, a suggestive
identification may be found inadmissible only where the judge concludes that it
is so unreliable that it should not be considered by the jury. In such a case, a
subsequent in-court identification cannot be more reliable than the earlier out-ofcourt identification, given the inherent suggestiveness of in-court identifications
and the passage of time.”); State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 731 (Conn. 2012) (finding
expert testimony on reliability appropriate because many factors influencing
identifications are not naturally within the jury’s province); State v. Cabagbag, 277
P.3d 1027, 1040 (Haw. 2012) (exercising court’s supervisory power to ensure that
a special jury instruction is given on potential factors influencing an
identification’s reliability upon defendant’s request); State v. Marquez, 967 A.2d
56, 69–71 (Conn. 2009) (specifying detailed criteria for the assessment of
suggestive behavior); State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1110, 1118 (Utah 2009)
(finding broad cautionary instructions do not effectively assist juries in spotting
misidentifications and calling for routine admission of expert testimony on
reliability); Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771, 771 n.8 (Ga. 2005) (rejecting
certainty as a reliability factor); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 591–92 (Wis.
2005) (declaring showups to be inherently suggestive and revisiting Brathwaite
and Biggers in light of recent scientific evidence which is “now impossible . . . to
ignore”); State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 576 (Kan. 2003) (announcing a “refinement”
of the federal due process test using five factors adopted in Ramirez); State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780–81 (Utah 1991) (modifying three reliability factors to
focus directly on impacts of suggestion).
123. See generally Gomes, 22 N.E.3d. at 897 (Mass. 2015) (asserting new tests for
admitting eyewitness identifications); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012) (en
banc); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
124. Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 427 (Alaska 2016).
125. Holden v. State, 602 P.2d 452 (Alaska 1979), overruled by Young, 374 P.3d
395.
126. See id. at 456 (applying the admissibility test, including the “totality of the
circumstances” language and Biggers factors, adopted in Brathwaite).
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analysis of precisely how it corresponded with Alaska’s constitutional
due process requirement.127 In Buchanan v. State,128 the court rejected the
defendant’s request for an instruction focusing on possible inadequacies
of an eyewitness identification at issue.129 While Buchanan was decided
three months prior to Brathwaite, its holding regarding the necessity of
jury instructions on the issue was not abrogated until 2016 by Young v.
State.130
In 2009, the court of appeals’ decision in Tegoseak v. State131 provided
an impetus for reform. Before the grand jury that indicted Frank Tegoseak
for driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license and
at his subsequent trial, an eyewitness testified as to his impaired
driving.132 The eyewitness had chosen Tegoseak out of a photographic
lineup as the person he had seen driving in an impaired manner.133
Despite flaws in the lineup procedure,134 the superior court, employing

127. See Young, 374 P.3d at 406 n.31 (reviewing cases decided under the
Brathwaite test and finding that, while such cases accepted the test as consistent
with Alaska’s Constitution, explicit analysis of an unnecessary suggestiveness test
was lacking); see, e.g., Viveros v. State, 606 P.2d 790, 792, 792 n.1 (Alaska 1980)
(declining to adopt a per se rule of exclusion in evaluating a photographic lineup
for police suggestiveness and reliability); Klockenbrink v. State, 472 P.2d 958, 961–
62 (Alaska 1970) (discussing the Stovall component of Brathwaite); Anderson v.
State, 123 P.3d 1110, 1116 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (asserting that “the test in Alaska
is the same one announced by the United States Supreme Court” as Alaska had
never expressly rejected Brathwaite or Stovall).
128. Buchanan v. State, 561 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1977), abrogated by Young, 374
P.3d 395.
129. Id. at 1207.
130. Young, 374 P.3d at 429.
131. Tegoseak v. State, 221 P.3d 345 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009).
132. Id. at 346.
133. Id.
134. Tegoseak was in the passenger seat of the vehicle when it was stopped by
police, but the dispatcher had been informed that the passenger and the driver
had switched places. Id. at 347. Thus, it was suspected that Tegoeseak had been
the driver who may have been intoxicated. Id. To account for there having been
multiple men in the car, police showed the eyewitness two photo arrays. Id. at 348.
Tegoseak was included in the second one, but not the first. Id. Upon being shown
the first photo array, the witness selected two photos that could have been one of
the passengers, one of which was correct, and also incorrectly identified Tegoseak.
Id. Knowing that the identification had been incorrect, the officer conducting the
photo lineup told the eyewitness to look at the second photo array and reminded
the witness that he had identified one of two men as the person who had been in
the driver’s seat, therefore suggesting that he should look carefully for the person
who had been in the passenger’s seat—that is, Tegoseak—in the second one. See
id.; see also id. at 361. When the eyewitness viewed the second photo array, he
indicated that picture number five, which was indeed Tegoseak, could have been
the person he had observed, as could the picture he had identified in the first
photo array. Id at 348.
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Brathwaite, held that the identification was reliable and permitted
admission of the evidence at trial.135
Even before the New Jersey Supreme Court’s innovative discussion
in Henderson, the Alaska court of appeals in Tegoseak endeavored to
underscore the generally accepted scientific principles of human memory,
its effect on eyewitness identifications, and the failure of the Brathwaite
doctrine to consider these issues.136 In reviewing some of the then-current
research on eyewitness identification reliability, the court stated that its
goal was:
[T]o acknowledge that psychological research into eyewitness
identification has furnished new insights into the potential
suggestiveness of identification procedures, and to point out
that this research has illuminated the related problem that a
suggestive identification procedure can work an after-the-fact
alteration of a witness’s memory of a criminal episode.137
B.

Answering Tegoseak’s Call in Young

Seven years after Tegoseak, the Alaska Supreme Court took up the
challenge to depart from Brathwaite in Young v. State.138 On August 15th,
2008, following a string of violent incidents between the Bloods and the
Crips gangs in Fairbanks, an SUV—inconsistently described as gray,
silver, or white—approached two cars carrying Bloods gang-members.139
Occupants of the SUV then began shooting at one of the cars, which led
to a high-speed shootout for approximately two miles.140
Arron Young was arrested in connection with the shooting later that
evening.141 The key to a silver SUV was found in his pocket and a gun was
recovered from his waistband.142 Young was indicted by a grand jury for
attempted murder in the first degree as well as misconduct involving a
weapon in the first degree.143 During the grand jury proceedings, the State
presented three eyewitnesses to identify Young.144 The first witness, Jason
135. Id. at 346.
136. See id. at 353–60 (highlighting the weaknesses of the Biggers factors and
assumptions inherent to the Brathwaite doctrine about the reliability of eyewitness
identifications, as well as the changing attitude in the legal system toward such
evidence following the implementation of DNA testing).
137. Tegoseak, 221 P.3d at 363.
138. See Young, 374 P.3d at 426–27 (announcing the replacement of Alaska’s
adopted Brathwaite test).
139. Id. at 399.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 399–400.
144. Id. at 399.
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Gazewood, had contacted the police and reported that he had witnessed
the shooting.145 The police interviewed him at his office and showed him
a photographic lineup featuring six photographs.146 Gazewood identified
Young’s photograph as most closely resembling the man he saw driving
the SUV involved in the shooting.147 Before the grand jury, the second
witness, Arles Arauz, identified Young as the driver of the SUV from a
photographic lineup, even though he had informed police immediately
following the shooting that he could not identify any of the assailants.148
The third witness, John Anzalone, failed to select Young’s photograph
when testifying before the grand jury.149
Young moved to suppress the Gazewood pre-trial and in-court
identifications on grounds that they were unnecessarily suggestive.150 The
superior court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, during which
Gazewood testified that a detective had come to his office three days after
the shooting, showed him six photographs without instructions, and,
after Gazewood narrowed the photographs down to two choices and
placed his finger hesitatingly on Young’s photograph, the detective told
him to “trust your instincts.”151 Gazewood testified that he interpreted the
comment to mean, “that’s the guy we want you to pick.”152 The superior
court denied the motion pursuant to a Brathwaite analysis, finding that the
photographic lineup was not unnecessarily suggestive because it had
contained nothing to distinguish Young’s photograph from the others.153
Further, the superior court determined that the detective’s comment was
not suggestive and that it did not influence Gazewood’s identification.154
The State disclosed to Young on the first day of his trial that
Anzalone, despite failing to identify Young’s photograph before the
grand jury, would identify Young at trial, as he had seen a photograph of
Young on television a week before trial, recognized him, and identified
him.155 Young argued that the in-court identification would be
improperly suggestive because he would be the only African-American
man sitting with the defense and the previous identification (which was

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 400.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 400–01.
154. Id. at 401 (stating also that “even if the procedure was unnecessarily
suggestive, Gazewood’s identification of Young was still reliable under the
totality of the circumstances and therefore admissible”).
155. Id.
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unreliable due to the pretrial publicity) could not overcome the problem
of racially-biased suggestiveness.156 The court ruled that Anzalone could
not testify about his pre-trial identification, but that an in-court
identification was permissible.157 The court also denied Young’s request
for jury instructions identifying factors which may influence the
reliability of eyewitness identifications or a set of instructions approved
in United States v. Telfaire.158
Lastly, Young filed for a mistrial because the court admitted an
identification of Young by Arauz, which he had made the night of the
shooting after initially denying his ability to recognize the assailants.159
Arauz was formerly associated with the Bloods and knew Young, as the
two had been involved in a fight during high school.160 The State did not
disclose the Arauz identification to Young until mid-trial.161 Again,
Young was denied relief.162
Young was convicted, and argued on appeal that the admission of
the Gazewood and Anzalone identifications constituted error under
Brathwaite.163 He also challenged the superior court’s rejection of his
proposed jury instructions and refusal to grant him a mistrial.164 The court
of appeals affirmed the conviction, and Young petitioned the Alaska
Supreme Court, urging it to abandon Brathwaite, adopt a new eyewitness
identification admission test pursuant to the Alaska Constitution’s due
process clause, and reverse his conviction.165
Young’s petition presented a ripe opportunity for the Alaska
Supreme Court to craft a new test, one which would, like Tegoseak, take a
“close look at the scientific evidence related to eyewitness identifications
and . . . change the standards for determining their admissibility and the
instructions that inform juries about how to assess their weight.”166
Applying Brathwaite to the facts of Young, the court found that the
admission of the Gazewood identification was harmless error and that the
due process protections against unnecessarily suggestive identifications
did not apply to Anzalone’s in-court identification.167 However, the court
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 403; see also United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (detailing a widely-recognized cautionary instruction for juries considering
eyewitness testimony).
159. Young, 374 P.3d at 402.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 404.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 405.
167. Id.
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then declared that changed circumstances justified replacing Brathwaite
moving forward.168
These “changed circumstances” related to scientific developments
on the reliability of eyewitness identifications and courts’ responses,
which had weakened the Alaska Supreme Court’s confidence that
Brathwaite afforded due process protections under the Alaska
Constitution.169 While studies on eyewitness reliability began prior to
Brathwaite, a much higher rate of research into the processes and fallibility
of memory took place in the decades to follow.170 Because New Jersey
incorporated much of this scientific research into the opinion and Special
Report of Henderson, the Young court reviewed and adopted those
findings, as well as findings by other state courts and committees
concerning eyewitness identifications.171
Closely adhering to the framework of Henderson,172 Young required a
criminal defendant to present evidence of suggestiveness in the form of
system variables, not estimator variables, capable of resulting in a
misidentification to receive an evidentiary hearing.173 Young’s nonexclusive list of system variables includes blind administration, preidentification instructions, compositions of lineups and photographic
arrays, feedback from law enforcement and recording confidence at the
time of identification, showups (which become less reliable within two
hours of the event witnessed), and multiple viewings (as initial viewings
may decrease the reliability of subsequent viewings).174 The estimator
variables illustrated by Young—which come into play later in the test—
also are not exclusive.175 They include the witness’s stress, weapons focus,
duration of the viewing, environmental conditions of the viewing,
168. Id.
169. Id. at 413.
170. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 16 (2014).
171. See generally State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 892 (N.J. 2011); REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL MASTER, supra note 7, at 8–14; KANE ET AL., supra note 119; see also
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 905, 909–10 (Mass. 2015); State v.
Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 720–22 (Conn. 2012); State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 1027, 1035–
38 (Haw. 2012); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 685 (Or. 2012); State v. Clopten, 223
P.3d 1103, 1108 (Utah 2009); and State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 591–92 (Wis.
2005) (laying out relevant scientific data and principles which the Young court
evaluated along with the rationales and evidence behind the Henderson test to
determine the test’s fit with Alaska’s constitutional requirements).
172. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919–22 (announcing its admissibility test and lists
of system and estimator variables, which Young substantially adopts).
173. Young, 374 P.3d at 427.
174. Id. at 417–22.
175. See id. at 417 (noting that “the science of eyewitness identifications is
‘probabilistic’” and seeking to identify “variables that are relevant to evaluating
the risk of a misidentification”).
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witness characteristics (such as physical and mental health, vision, age,
and alcohol or drug use), perpetrator characteristics (such as a disguise or
change in appearance between the event and the viewing), race and
ethnicity bias, memory decay or a long interval between the event and the
identification, and the presence of co-witnesses (who may contaminate
the independence of an identification).176 Importantly, the threshold
showing to trigger this pretrial hearing need not rise to the level of
“unnecessarily suggestive.”177 Rather, demonstrating that the
identification involved a system variable is sufficient for the defendant to
be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.178
At that hearing, the State must present evidence of reliability
notwithstanding the presence of one or more system variables, and the
court’s “ensuing analysis of reliability should consider all relevant system
and estimator variables under the totality of the circumstances.”179 The
defendant carries the burden to prove, given all the system and estimator
variables at play, that there is a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.”180
Should the defendant fail to meet his or her burden in the
evidentiary hearing, the court should admit the identification subject to
an appropriate jury instruction which takes into account the Young test
and the factors which may influence a given identification’s reliability.181
As the New Jersey court did in Henderson, the Alaska Supreme Court also
charged the Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions Committee with drafting
a new set of model instructions consistent with the scientific principles
and admissibility test announced in Young.182 As an additional measure,
the court encouraged expert testimony that “explains, supplements, or
challenges the application of these variables to different fact situations”—
especially given the continually changing nature of scientific
understandings, which may move beyond those currently recognized.183

176. Id. at 422–26.
177. Id. at 427.
178. Id.
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id. (citing to the standard of proof from State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872,
920 (N.J. 2011)).
181. Id. at 427–28 (acknowledging that scientifically valid principles are not
necessarily within the jury’s province of knowledge, and thus, reliability
characteristics may contradict commonsense assumptions).
182. Id. at 428.
183. Id. at 427.
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CONCLUSION
Combining these safeguards to prevent the injustice that can occur
at the hands of a misidentification, Young adopts a model that has the
potential to more effectively provide due process of law, where a high
misidentification rate and a correspondingly high wrongful conviction
rate show that such a model is desperately needed.184
The test Young announced enhances due process protections for
criminal defendants, but it does not solve the issues of jury bias and
mistaken assumptions about reliability. The jury instruction mandate
given by the Young court aims to alleviate these problems by challenging
assumptions and putting triers of fact on notice of risks they might not
otherwise consider in evaluating testimony.185 However, due process
does not and cannot prevent the introduction of internally-held biases
into the criminal justice system any more than it can mandate that juries
understand and thoughtfully consider all relevant scientific data in
reaching a verdict. For instance, while the court could not invoke the due
process clause to prevent admission of John Anzalone’s in-court
identification in response to seeing a photograph of Arron Young on
television,186 the advancements made by the Alaska Supreme Court
through Young, as well as in states whose eyewitness identification
admissibility doctrines preceded it, illustrate that improvement is
possible. In 1977, only five factors were considered relevant enough to the
issue of reliability to warrant consideration by a court where extremely
influential eyewitness evidence was at issue.187 Science and law have
advanced greatly in the past forty years, but if Brathwaite illustrates any
point, it is that progress must breed more progress, not entrenchment of
currently-accepted principles.188
By adopting a test based on up-to-date scientific principles, Young
did more than provide a comprehensive list of the reliability factors
accepted in today’s scientific community. The test the Alaska Supreme

184. See
Eyewitness
Misidentification,
THE
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.
php (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (asserting that eyewitness misidentifications are
the “greatest contributing factor to wrongful convictions proven by DNA testing,”
involved in over 70% of convictions nationwide overturned on account of DNA
evidence).
185. Young, 374 P.3d at 428.
186. Id. at 410–11.
187. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114–16 (1977) (following the factors
laid out in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972)).
188. Young, 374 P.3d at 414–17 (noting the explosion of scientific research since
Brathwaite and the fact that the Brathwaite test no longer serves its purposes in light
of those insights).
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Court formulated, based on the careful and well-grounded analysis in
Henderson, achieved two overarching goals. First, Young and Henderson
recognized the intertwined nature of the two prongs of Brathwaite which
had been previously treated as distinct: suggestive techniques and what
are considered “inherent” reliability factors such as a witness’s
confidence.189 Second, even current understanding about the risks of
misidentifications190 and the counterintuitive factors influencing
reliability191 are subject to evolution.192 Exclusive tests not only lead to
“checklist” judicial decision-making but also lie in certain danger of
becoming obsolete, while due process hangs in the balance. No test can
be completely cognizant of the multitude of influences that may affect any
given identification, and neither the Young test nor its counterparts fully
regulate the wide range of estimator variables that may exist.193 However,
even if the protections provided in Young and its counterparts are
incomplete in their efforts to prevent unreliable eyewitness evidence, they
are necessary to achieve compatibility between eyewitness identifications
and due process. Young brings Alaska considerably closer to that goal.

189. Id. at 426 (stating that the “certainty-inflation effect [produced by
feedback from law enforcement or other witnesses] is greater for eyewitnesses
who make mistaken identifications than it is for those who make accurate
identifications”).
190. See GARRETT, supra note 62, at 80–81 (noting that suggestive procedures
and misidentifications are part of a larger problem in aligning criminal justice
with modern science).
191. See Young v. Conway, 698 F.3d 69, 79 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that reliability
factors are “not coterminous with ‘common sense’”).
192. Young, 374 P.3d at 427.
193. See Nichols v. Eckert, 504 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Alaska 1973) (holding that the
Due Process Clause only regulates state action and requires “deprivation of an
individual interest of sufficient importance to warrant constitutional protection”).

